Once more to the beach dear friends
"I will get around to the frontline update later.
But I wanted to start out with attrition.
Attrition
We have now officially reached the halfway point in the war in regards of attrition of Russian equipment.
This does not equate halway point in time though, this due to the timeline of the destruction of Russian equipment not being linear.
As Ukraine has acquired new capabilities this rate has slowly increased over time.
This means that Ukraine is now destroying more equipment, with fewer losses per piece of equipment.
Ie., it has become far easier to whack things for Ukraine.
So, what I am trying to say is that the time to destroy the second half should be shorter than the first part.
On top of that an army is like a house built of separate blocks put on top of each other forming the house.
If you remove a few blocks things will start to fall down on their own.
It is easy to stare yourself blind on tanks, armoured fighting vehicles, artillery and so on.
But, without a heck of a lot of support systems these become very easy to take out.
Without counter-battery radars your artillery is defenceless, without air defence everything is defenceless, etcetera.
We know that Russian air defence is now down below the 25 percent remaining level in ALL of Russia.
Our estimate is that about 10 percent of the missiles in these systems remain in inventory.
This is based on observable data and firing patterns.
Unless it is an insanely valuable target Russia will not use what little that remain.
Two days ago Sevastopol and the Balbek airfied was targeted by drones and missiles, it is a high value target.
Russia did not fire a single AD missile.
Same went for Berdyansk and Luhansk airfields, and that caused an insane price.
For these two it might have been due to the radars not even picking up what was incoming, but over at Balbek Ukraine used drones and S-200 missiles that are visible.
This probably means that only Kremlin itself, Putins residences, and the Kersh Bridge are still being protected by AD.
The rest of Moscow is not protected, we know this since the AD is not firing on drones going to other places in Moscow.
This means that to all points and purposes Russia has lost this capability.
But, this was not what I was aiming at writing about from my spot on the beach.
It was their airforce.
Ka-52
I wanted to specificially talk about their loss of attack helicopter capacity.
But first, let us look at the losses over the last 11 days.
18 Ka-52, 12 total loss and 6 damaged.
5 SU-25 Attack Aircraft, all destroyed in air.
Russia started the war officially owning 133 Ka-52 helicopters.
Of those 65 were airworthy at the start of the war, the rest were used as donours of spareparts.
It is not so shocking, this is a helicopter mainly built in the 80s, things do break, and money for spare parts and upkeap has mainly been used on superyachts in Russia.
Out of those 65 the attrition have been horrendous, 58 have been downed, blow up on the tarmac, or stopped flying for various reasons.
No new or refurbished Ka-52s have been seen in the wild.
Having 7 Ka-52s is not that impressive.
Do they have any alternative?
Well, yes... they do have the 60s constructed and 70s built Mi-24 Hind and its sub-variants.
These were built in stupendous numbers and exported everywhere, stupendous being 2 600 of them.
The Soviet Union had 1600 of them, but lost 600 in Afghanistan (Ouch), and as the Soviet Union broke apart 500 of them ended up in Russia.
Of those 328 was in the official registry as of January 2022.
In reality about 80 of those have been seen flying since the war started (and yes we keep track of these things), meaning that the rest most likely are donour machines.
Not so weird since production of spare parts have stopped in favour of the Ka-52.
Problem is that the Mi-24 can't be used in the same way as the Ka-52, yes officially it is an attack-helicopter, but it is more built to support special ops since it carries 8 soldiers and functions as support for them.
It is far larger and more cumbersome than the Ka-52.
A conservative estimate is that Russia now has 30 of them remaining in anything resembling a working condition.
And, if one would fly into the battlefields on the frontline it is unable to perform the necessary manouvres to avoid being shot down by a stinger, something that was amply proven in Afghanistan.
What I am trying to say is that Russia for all points and purposes have lost this capability beyond doing attacks just for show, it is no longer having an impact on the war.
Airforce & ATACMs
Since more has been divulged from somewhat official sources in the US I can talk a bit more openly about ATACMS.
Ukraine will get all of them, of all types.
Yeah, party... no?
There's a caveat though, and that is in regards of delivery rate.
Ukraine get 1 for each PrSM replacement missile that the US is getting.
And Lockheed Martin is producing 20 of these per month, this might increase up to 30 over the next year as production is fine-tuned.
It is though not expected to increase beyond that.
This means that for the foreseeable future these will be used only on extreme value targets like airfields (there is no more high value than that really, well... there is Kersh).
The ATACMS come in 2 basic flavours that are usable (there are a couple of sub-types though), and Ukraine is receiving all types.
1. M39 Block 1, 1000 bomblets and 165km range. Perfect for F***ing up an airfield. There's roughly 1000 of these buggers.
2. M39 A1, 300 bomblets enabling larger fuel tanks giving a range of 300km. Problem is that these does not exist, they where converted into Unitary Bombs to bust bunkers, the Ukrainians might attempt to retool them to bomblets again.
3. M-48 to M57E1. About 800 of these 300km unitary bomb payload beasts. 220 of these are airburst able and can be used against distant airfields beyond the 165km marker. The remaining 600ish are perfect to crush bunkers, bridges, and other harder targets.
But, one exploding 10 meters under a runway would be... impressive.
This means that having any form of planes or helicopters parked on a base 165kms from any front is a definite nogo.
It also rather quickly means that parking any planes or helicopters within the 300km marker is not a good idea if you wish to keep your airplanes and pilots healthy.
This makes it more or less impossible for Russia to use helicopters in Ukraine, and that raids with planes is far trickier since it would by necessity involve using aerial fueling procedures, something Russia is not that good at, so it would limit the number of planes possible to use at the same time.
So, where are Ukraine allowed to use them?
Against airfield they can use the M-39 Block 1 any place they jolly wish to, there are no limitations on this.
Airburst modded can be used on airfields beyond that.
This means that the Russian airforce can be hit in Russia with them.
But, it was strongly suggested to use them sparingly and only take out an airfield now and then to slowly push them out, at least to begin with.
The unitary bunker busters are for now restricted to Ukraine's 1991 borders and territorial waters.
For any other use special permission need to be given.
This is not though as important since the GLSDB is free to use.
The important part is to remove the threat from airframes since these can pop up fast and surprisingly and are a longrange weapon of significant power.
Bunkers rarely come and jump you unexpectedly...
Here it is a good idea to note that 3 nautical miles of the Kersh Bridge is within Ukrainian territorial waters.
That is lot of real estate to bonk.
Caveat: Ukraine is receiving them in the order of oldest to youngest.
So, they get about 18 M39 Block 1s and 2 M-48s per month for now.
It is also good to remember that the ATACMS have a somewhat unimpressive SEP of 9 meters.
This means that only 50 percent wil land within 9 meters out from the target point, GMLRS is 1.5m and GLSDB is 0.5.
This means that about 1 out of two is likely to miss any bridge-formed object...
Fonts
In Luhansk the general denippling of Russia continues at a satisfying rate causing many Russians to stop functioning, and costing quite a bit of Russian equipment.
Lyman Pershyi is slowly being taken regardless of Russia fighting claw and tooth to keep it in their grasp.
If they lose that all Russian hope of advances towards Kupyansk are gone.
It is taken in a somewhat unimaginitative and plodding way, but it is effective I must admit.
Bakhmut
Due to the general lack of moving Russians Ukraine moved NE toward Bakhmut and Opytne by about 300 meters as they took a large field in that direction. It is now confirmed green.
It is expected that more of this will come with time due to no new reinforcements arriving here.
Avdivka
Yesterday Russia lost 500 infantry men in the direction of Terrakon, and same goes for today.
It makes a warped sort of sense that they are attacking it, but sending 500 infantry at a time will not solve the problem ever.
It would take weeks of pounding that pile of slag with artillery, and then two attack-vectors of 1000 men each to even have a chance of taking it.
It is a very large thing, and to take it you have to climb a 25 to 80 meter high wall, and 25 meter part is pointed towards the Ukrainians, and the 80 meter part towards you.
From the Terrakon you have a very good view overlooking all of Avdivka, and it is completely impossible to approach it without being seen unless there is fog or heavy rain.
Tank Girl commanded the place for a short while as one of her first independent commands.
She justs giggle evily when I ask about if it can be taken by the Russians, I can imagine why.
In Avdivka there is not a single spot where it does not loom.
It has the same black brooding ominious look as Mordor does.
Russians are a particular kind of stupid, so I guess that they will try to meatwave mordor for a couple of more weeks.
Otherwise the area is slowing down still, and our forces are slowly pushing away the last couple of nipples.
But, there will for now not be any counteroffensive here for shelly reasons.
Tokmak Axis
Here it seems like the grinding away at the last defence line in the first Surovikin line is going slowly but good.
For now Oleksandr is keeping the options open in regards of doing a slow grind or a thunder run.
He is bringing forward reserves that can cover both options.
Kherson
I am starting to have even more opinions about what is happening here.
Russia handed Ukraine a free pass to make a substantial amphibeous campaign, and they did not take it.
It is slowly ongoing, but at the going rate this will come to nothing in the end.
I was highly "opinioned" when I said as much yesterday.
I hope that it will have an effect, otherwise Zaluzhnyy and the HQ is handing Russia 3 more months of war.
Advantage of being me is that I can have as many "opinions" as I wish since I am not ****-bothered with any military career.
I have now achieved my goal of having "opinioned" every single army general in Ukraine, loudly.
And, yes that does include Tank Girl back at Kreminna.
It was when I found her on the frontline playing battalion commander, I screamed like a banshee for 30 minutes on taking risks as a field commander...
At the same time I also promised to personally kill her guards if they allowed her to do it again, or let her be killed, they believed me.
Took two weeks before she even talked to me.
But, the message was received.
Beach
It is 28C, I am on my fourth cherry bomb drink.
I wish the beach was not half consisting of "boys of various types", but they are at least in civilian clothes.
But, a bunch of cossacks wandering around with assault rifles kind of stick out a tad, even in Ukraine.
Seriously, it is a very weird feeling trying to relax and feel "normal" when you have guards surrounding you, and two armoured vehicles with autocannons idling nearby, and snipers on the roof of a house and an air defence unit on another roof...
It is sort of a ballance of staying safe, and not going insane due to being cooped up in one ******** of a factory after another.
Time for another cherry bomb."